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Abstract  
Zhengzhou is one of the fastest growing cities in China, but has attracted comparatively little 
international attention. This paper charts the contemporary transformation of Zhengzhou 
and highlights some of the challenges that arise from its recent growth. It demonstrates the 
rise of Zhengzhou from small town to megacity. This transformation has occurred in less 
than seven decades with Zhengzhou benefiting from its geographic importance and its 
position as a provincial capital in China’s hierarchical system of government. While western 
accounts typically focus on the role of market forces and agglomeration economies in 
explaining the rise of megacities, we show the role of political decisions in explaining the 
growth of Zhengzhou as an international centre for manufacturing, commerce and logistics. 
The paper concludes that innovation and reform in regional governance, particularly to deal 
with emerging challenges, are necessary, if it is to develop a well-functioning megacity. 
Keywords 
Zhengzhou, Emerging Megacity, EuroAsian Transportation and Logistics Hub, International 
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Introduction  
In 2016, the Economist Intelligence Unit identified Zhengzhou as one of the fastest growing 
cities in China. But Zhengzhou is a city which has attracted comparatively little international 
attention. Although the city has a long history, it is only in recent years  it has grown at 
exponential rates. By 2017, Zhengzhou reached a population of 9.88 million (ZZSB, 2018), 
just short of megacity status – defined by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
as urban agglomeration of over 10 million people.  In this paper, we chart the contemporary 
transformation of Zhengzhou and highlight some of the challenges that arise from its recent 
growth. When Zhengzhou became the capital of Henan province in 1954, it had a population 
of 160,000. Today’s city would be scarcely recognisable to residents from that time. 
Nevertheless, despite the scale of recent change, Zhengzhou remains deeply shaped by its 
past. On the face of it, the growth of megacities is the outcome of agglomeration economies 
arising from the market processes, in which interventions in land-use planning typically 
hinders urban growth by restricting processes of economic concentration (Pike et al, 2017). 
But, the story of Zhengzhou highlights the importance of political decision-making and the 
role of economic, social and land-use planning in shaping urban development in China. 
Hence, in this paper we focus on the political economy of the city’s growth. Agglomeration 
processes have certainly shaped the recent development of Zhengzhou, but the role of 
political decision has been crucial. We show how, as capital of the province of Henan, 
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Zhengzhou’s development been heavily shaped by the actions of national, provincial and 
local governments. In the remainder of this paper we describe, first, the historical 
geography of the city, second, the development of the city under central planning, the 
impact of more market-oriented forms of development and Zhengzhou’s current ambitions 
to act in the global arena. 
 
Historical geography of Zhengzhou 
Zhengzhou (also known as Chengchow in the 19th and the first half of 20th century), as the 
capital of Henan, is the political, economic, technological, and educational centre of the 
province, China’s most populous province, containing more than 100 million. Located on the 
southern bank of the middle reach of the Yellow River (Figure 1), the city is recognised as 
one of the eight great ancient capitals of China. Historically, the rise and fall of Zhengzhou 
has been closely linked to its position as a transportation hub because of its geographical 
location. Its modern renaissance was brought about by its emergence as an important 
railway junction in the first decade of twentieth century establishing its position as a 
commercial and trading centre in central China (ZZCEG, 1990). 
 
 
Figure 1 Location of Zhengzhou  
Source: Author developed based on Henan GIS data  
 
The earliest history of Zhengzhou can be traced back to some 3500 years ago when it was 
the national capital of the Shang dynasty (1600 BC – 1046 BC). Archaeological excavation 
has shown the city already had a built-up area around 16 km2 which was well planned, 
walled, and protected by a moat. It became a regional centre when the Shang moved their 
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capital to elsewhere due to natural disaster and war around BC 13th century. During the 
following eight centuries or so, the development of agriculture in Zhou dynasty (1046 BC – 
256 BC) made it possible for nomadic tribes to settle and form feudal states (ZZCEG, 1990). 
Zhengzhou served as either the capital of vassal states or fiefdoms throughout the Zhou 
period. Under China’s first emperor in the Qin dynasty (221 BC – 206 BC), it became a 
county town. Since the Han dynasty (202 BC – AD 220), either Xi’an (Chang’an) or Luoyang 
was the principal capital until the Song dynasty (AD 960 – AD 1279). The enlargement of the 
Chinese territory and the relative development of eastern and southern regions favoured 
Zhengzhou’s geographical position and it emerged as centre for agricultural products and 
handicrafts. By Sui dynasty (AD 581 – AD 618) the name of Zhengzhou was first officially 
chartered and the city became the seat of a prefectural administration under the direct 
control of the emperor. Later, Zhengzhou occupied a strategic position on the Grand Canal, 
supplying food and handicraft products from the south and east to the capitals at Luoyang 
and/or Chang'an to the west and the frontier armies to the north. Since the Northern Song 
(960 – 1127), however, the move of the capital eastward to Kaifeng, then southward to 
Hangzhou, Nanjing and northward to Beijing reduced the importance of Zhengzhou. But, the 
city had always served as the seat of either a prefectural or county administration.    
Zhengzhou’s position as a major transportation hub was reinvented by the intersection of 
China’s two major railways in the first decade of the 20th century, reasserting the 
importance of its geographical location. When Pinghan Railway, the North-South artery 
linking Beijing and Hankou, intersected with Longhai Railway, the main West-East railway 
connecting Kaifeng and Luoyang, the city became a regional centre for commerce and trade, 
particularly for cotton, grain, peanuts, and other agricultural products (Liu, J., 1984 (1929)). 
Shigejiro Hayashi (1921), a Japanese economist predicted Zhengzhou would become a 
Chinese Chicago. The Travel Magazine <旅行杂志>, the most influential tourist magazine in 
China in the 1920s, referred to Zhengzhou as a major metropolis in northern China. 
However, the subsequent civil war and Japanese invasion during the 1930s and 1940s had 
almost destroyed the city. By the time the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded, 
the city had a population of 164,000, while the built-up area shrank to under 5.23 km2 
(Wang, X. S., et al., 2005).  
 
Urban development before the 1984 urban reform  
The establishment of the PRC marked the start of a new stage of development for 
Zhengzhou. The communist government followed China’s tradition of maintaining several 
tiers of sub-national government but reinforcing its centralisation and hierarchical top-down 
control. Taking advantage of its position as the national railway hub, Zhengzhou replaced 
Kaifeng as the provincial capital in 1954, which, in the context of top-down control over 
resources allocation, placed the city in a privileged position over Kaifeng and other cities in 
Henan. On the one hand, being transformed from a county town to a provincial capital, 
Zhengzhou was radically enlarged by the relocation of provincial government and upgrading 
the municipal government to prefectural level. On the other hand, benefitting from its 
geographical location and provincial capital status, the city was selected by the central 
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government as one of 15 favourable cities across the country to be primarily supported by 
the central state for development (Liu, Yanpu, 1988).  
Under the new policy, Chinese cities were either established as, or transformed to become, 
production centres. In addition to its function as the political and administrative centre of 
Henan province, Zhengzhou was also planned to develop towards a city that would focus on 
producing industrial equipment and light industrial products. Benefitting disproportionately 
from these redistributive policies, several textile factories and other manufacturers were 
either moved to or founded in Zhengzhou during the first and second “Five-Year Social and 
Economic Development Plan (FYP) (1952-1961)” period. This laid the foundation for the 
city’s subsequent development, but also created a path dependency for the development in 
the immediate post-reform period.  
A very constrained industrial base emerged as a result of these policies. Rather than 
expanding the capacity or productivity of the existing unit of factories, new investment was 
mainly used to build new factory units, often producing similar products. For example, the 
five central state-owned textile mills built in the then western suburbs between 1954 and 
1959 brought more than 100,000 skilled workers from Shanghai and other eastern cities to 
Zhengzhou. By 1959, the industrial output by the six mills1 reached RMB 450 million (US$ 
171.95 million) at present value and generated 60% of Zhengzhou’s total tax revenue (Wu & 
Zhang, 2009).  
Zhengzhou’s urban expansion or economic growth during the early period of PRC relied 
predominantly on the creation of factory units and public agencies – government bodies, 
central state-owned enterprises (SOEs), local SOEs, and local collective-owned enterprises – 
known as “work units”. While the relocation of provincial government brought about 
190,000 population to the city, the consolidation of its role as a major national 
transportation hub added another 150,000 to the city. Following on this path, within less 
than 10 years, the city’s built up area expanded to 71km2 with a registered population of 
673,000 (ZZMG, 1989).   
This model of urban development, however, was associated with problems. First, urban 
economic growth relied only on building factories units. There was no incentive to expand 
production at existing factories because profits and taxes generated were appropriated by 
the state and rarely reinvested. Taking the textile industry as an example, from 1954 to 
1959, when there was a new factory founded every year it saw the record growth of annual 
industrial output. However, the growth of their industrial output slowed down significantly 
when there was no new factories were added after 1959 (see Table 1).   
 
Table 1: The Average Annual Growth Rate of the Five Textile Mills in Zhengzhou between 
1954 and 1985 (%) 
                                                     
1 Five newly founded plus one pre-existing which was private owned but confiscated by the state after the 
communist revolution.  
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Industrial 
output  
Profit 
and Tax  
Labour 
Productivity  
Main Attribute 
1954-1959 100.31 134.68 19.29 One new factory added every year 
from 1953 to 1958  
1960-1962 -30.76 -29.38 -20.90 Great famine  
1963-1966 34.13 31.48 21.81 Recovery from the great famine  
1967-1976 -2.18 -6.08 -5.03 Cultural Revolution  
1977-1979 27.90 49.39 35.11 Recovery from Cultural Revolution 
1980-1985 2.16 -10.27 -2.05 Number of employees doubled as a 
result of absorbing redundant workers 
and existing employees’ family 
members who were sent to rural areas 
during Cultural Revolution while 
product lines remain unchanged and 
private competitor emerged    
Sources: Author collected and compiled from Factory Records of the Five Textile Mills in 
Zhengzhou  
 
 
Second, under the centrally planned economy, being designated as a national key city 
meant more SOEs located in the city than elsewhere. The politicisation and direct control of 
SOEs by the central authorities resulted in the marriage of local economic development and 
national politics.  As shown in Table 1, the growth and decline of textile industry which was 
once the dominant pillar of Zhengzhou’s economy was closely linked to the major political 
movements in the country. Because the profit and tax generated by SOEs were taken 
directly by the central authorities, the city found hard to provide infrastructure and services 
to the naturally increased urban population.   
 
Urban development in the post-1984 urban reform period    
China’s contemporary urban reform began in 1984, following the rural reforms in 1978. 
However, cities faced enormous pressure immediately after the end of Cultural Revolution, 
including providing accommodation and employment to tens of millions of returnees who 
had been sent to the countryside by the government since the “Anti-Right Wing Movement” 
started in 1957. The inability of state alone to meet such demand led to the unintended 
invention of the “dual-track system” allowing coexistence of the traditional plan system and 
an emerging market sphere (Naughton, 1996, p.8). Under such dual mechanisms, while the 
state plan still dominated the allocation of resources, all work units, including government 
departments and agencies, non-profit making public sectors, individuals, and even the 
military, could set-up self-funded enterprises outside the state plan. Following the same 
principle, SOEs could make and keep marginal profits. For the government, this was a 
solution through which employment opportunities could be created and funds raised for 
improving and creating housing. Zhengzhou followed this trend. Almost every work unit 
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established subordinated enterprises using the public funds it controlled to employ its 
affiliated family members. Meanwhile, the city once again benefited from its textile industry 
which not only absorbed 100,000 redundant workers, but also provided over 60,000 
additional jobs to the city (Wu & Zhang, 2009). This “growing out of the plan” pattern of 
development, as described by Naughton (1996), enabled Chinese cities in general, and 
Zhengzhou in particular, to avoid a potentially disastrous crisis.  
The urban economic reform coincided with a shift of regional policy from a redistributive 
approach to one which followed more market principles. However, central government 
continued to play a dominant role in what is now called “Socialist Market Economy”. Instead 
of directly creating SOEs, state intervention came in the form of an enhanced role for local 
governments in economic development with policy incentives and financial support from 
the central government. While policy incentives, such as Special Economic Zones, open 
cities for foreign direct investment and free trade, tax breaks, and so on, were exclusively 
applied to the designated coastal cities, funding support from the central government was 
used to improve urban infrastructure in these cities. As an inland city, Zhengzhou lost its 
favoured position. Meanwhile, the transition to a market economy in the coastal regions 
started with allowing foreign and private investment in light industries, particularly textiles. 
This led to textile industry soon becoming the most competitive sector in the country in the 
initial period of the reform. State owned textile factories began to struggle. Relying heavily 
on the textile industry, Zhengzhou’s economy suffered severely, resulting in growth rates 
slower than other inland cities whose economies were dominated by heavy industries, such 
as Wuhan and Changsha. Figure 2 presents a comparison of GDP growth rates between 
Zhengzhou and other comparable provincial capitals in the last four decades, showing 
Zhengzhou failed to keep pace with rapid growth elsewhere. Zhengzhou’s experience 
emerges as quite distinctive in the broader Chinese context.  
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Figure 2 Average Annual growth rate of GDP in selected provincial capitals in China 
Source: Author compiled from Statistic Yearbooks (various years) and Five-Year Social 
Economic Development Plans (FYP) of the six cities  
 
 
In the initial period of reform in the 1990s, Zhengzhou, however, was marked as a national 
pioneer in the reform of state monopoly in commercial sector. Taking the advantage of its 
role as a transport hub, numerous large wholesale markets for redistributing both 
production and consumer goods developed spontaneously in the eastern fringe of the city, 
close to the railway freight station. At the same time in the old centre of the town, several 
large modern department stores and malls funded by private or collective sector started to 
compete against state-run stores. As SOEs struggled, the unexpected emergence and rapid 
growth of the non-state commercial sector led to Zhengzhou being designated a 
“prosperous city for commerce and trade” (Qin, 1992).  
The immediate success of experimental marketisation and openness in the selected coastal 
cities led the inland regions to duplicate the policy, although without official endorsement 
from the central government. Following the model of special economic zones, local 
governments competed to create economic and technology development zones (ETDZ) 
and/or high technology development zones (HTDZ), which resulted in the national wide 
“ETDZ/HTDZ frenzy” in the 1990s. In this round, Zhengzhou managed to establish both an 
ETDZ and HTDZ in the south-eastern and north-western suburbs with planned areas of 
12.49km2 and 18.6km2 respectively (Liu, Ying, et al., 2008). The ETDZ and HTDZ in 
Zhengzhou were nevertheless not as successful as expected in terms of attracting inward 
investment in their earlier stage. It was not until manufacturers and higher education 
institutions relocated in to release land in the city centre for property development, that 
occupancy rates in both zones started to increase.   
 
Explosive urbanisation since 2000s 
At the turn of the millennium, a radical shift in urban policy occurred, which emphasised the 
role of cities as drivers of economic growth (China State Council, 2001). Investment in urban 
expansion, fuelled by large scale urban infrastructure, commercial and residential property 
development, replaced the previous sectoral policy focus on industries, leading to a new 
round of city building. Policy makers now tend to see large cities as essential for exploiting 
of agglomeration economies, with provincial and local governments adapting their policies 
accordingly. Local governments thus translated this into the creation of growth poles and/or 
primate cities in various scales to pursue agglomeration economies.  
In Henan, the provincial development strategy is increasingly focused on the promotion of 
Zhengzhou to strengthen its position of primacy within the province. Modelled on the 
Pudong new district of Shanghai, a series of new urban districts after the ETDZ and HTDZ 
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were planned, which were much larger than the existing built up areas (see Table 2). With a 
planned built up area of 150 km2 and a population of 1.5 million, Zhengdong New District 
(ZDND), which would double the size of the existing city, was set to be built within 10 years 
after 2003 (Li, K., 2010; Xue, et al., 2013). Consisting of six large single-function blocks, co-
located on large areas of land, with wide road systems and urban functions split by sector, 
such large scale of urban expansion in such a short period of time attracted international 
attention when the American CBS TV programme “60 Minutes” labelled ZDND a “ghost city” 
in 2013 (Pike, et al., 2017). By 2015, however, there had been 1.05 million people registered 
in the new district with 0.47 million physically living there and more than 100,000 people 
working in the central business district (ZZSB, 2016). Nevertheless, in contrast to what has 
been described by the location theory, the gathering of firms and public institutions in ZDND 
is mainly driven by Henan provincial and Zhengzhou municipal governments. Given the top-
down control of the governance system, headquarters of growing enterprises owned by 
provincial government, banks or their regional headquarters, and the like in the province 
were required to relocate to ZDND. With incentives such as cheap land, Hukou (or 
household registration) quotas for housing buyers and their families, ZDND has easily 
attracted inward investments and migration from the province, which helped the project to 
meet its planned targets.  
 
Table 2 Phased Urban Expansion in Zhengzhou  
Year of 
start 
Location Planned areas 
(km2) 
Existing built-up area    By 1987 
 
94.2 
Zhengzhou High-Tech Development 
Zone 
1988 Northwest 
suburbs 
18.6 
Zhengzhou Economic and Technology 
Development Zone 
1993 Southeast 
suburbs 
12.49 
Zhengdong New District 2001 Eastern 
suburbs 
150 
Zhengzhou New District 2007 Eastern 
suburbs 
150 
Zhengzhou Airport Economic Zone 2007 Southeast 
suburbs 
415 
Zhengxi New District 2015 Western 
suburbs 
72 
Sources: Author collected and compiled from various government documents and plans 
 
 
In 2007, some four years after the ZDND project started, Henan provincial government 
launched another giant project to develop Zhengzhou airport development zone with a 
planned area of 138km2.  Three years later, under the national policy of rebalancing regional 
development, central government approved a larger project expanding the site to 189km2, 
drawing on The Rise of Central Region Plan. Further approval was given in 2011 to expand 
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the development to cover 220km2 to support Zhengzhou developing as the central city of 
the Central Economic Region. In March 2013, as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, 
Zhengzhou was designated one of the key cities and Zhengzhou Airport was named to be 
the centre of the “Air Silk Road”2. The central government again nearly doubled the size of 
the airport development zone while formally designating the 415km2 Zhengzhou Airport 
Economic Zone (ZAEZ) as a national strategy to bring about the economic modernization 
and globalization of one of the nation’s largest provinces drawing on the “aerotropolis” 
model of development (Kasarda, 2015). The airport is planned to have a total of five 
runways, with one of which dedicated to cargo logistics, capable of handling 70 million 
passengers by 2030 and over three million metric tonnes of cargo annually by 2020. The 
new terminals will be interconnected with a multimodal transportation centre linked to 
major highways, intercity railways, high-speed railways and underground railways in the 
metropolitan region. An additional railway station – Zhengzhou South Railway Station – 
comprising 16 platforms with 32 lines – has been built to make the ZAEZ and Zhengzhou a 
truly integrated international transport hub.  
Simultaneously, to support Zhengzhou’s emergence as a megacity, Henan provincial 
government proposed to merge the urban areas of Kaifeng with Zhengzhou, expanding the 
ZDND eastwards to meet Kaifeng New District. The planned area is 2127km2, of which 
1840km2 is in the territory of Zhengzhou. Overlapping with the ZAEZ, ETDZ, and ZDND, it is 
intended to add another four blocks with a total built up area of 150km2 and a population of 
1.52 million by 2020, bringing a total population of 3.9 million to the area. Moreover, 
alongside the above initiatives led by the provincial government, Zhengzhou municipal 
government has planned to promote the western end of the city by converting 72km2 into 
urban land and developing a 150km2 industrial and civic centre, which will accommodate 
over 1.5 million people by 2020. Altogether, the city’s built up area will be expanded to 
around 1200km2 with a population of around 10 million by 2020 (ZZMG, 2015) (Figure 3). 
Benefited once again from being the capital of Henan province, which gives the city the best 
social infrastructure and economic opportunities over other cities within the province with a 
population of over 100 million, the planned target of population will be met without doubt. 
By 2017, the reported population was 9.88 million, an increase of 160,000 from 2016 (ZZSB, 
2018), which means the city is likely to reach the 10 million threshold by 2018.       
 
                                                     
2  -- The Rise of Central Region Plan was a national programme after the Development of West Region in 1999 
and Renaissance of North-eastern Region in 2004, published by China State Council in 2009 to support growth 
in Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Shanxi province.  
-- The Development of Central Economic Region was initiated by Henan Provincial Government and endorsed 
by China State Council in 2011.  
-- ZAEZ to develop the Air Silk Road was suggested by China’s president Xi Jinping under the Belt and Road 
Initiative in 2013.     
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Figure 3 Illustration of Urban Expansion  
Sources: Author compiled from major urban development plans  
   
The ambition is underpinned by a series of strategies and industrial policies powered by the 
central government, including free-trade zone, e-commerce cross-border platform, China 
Railway Express logistics hub, and special rates of duty and permits for customs clearance 
system, and so on. These policies were recently repackaged as the national programme 
supporting Zhengzhou’s place in the Belt and Road Initiatives, which aims to develop 
towards EuroAsian transportation and logistics hub and the international capital of 
commerce (ZZMG, 2015). Its geographic importance helps it once again gaining the extra 
support from the central government. Kasarda (2015) notes that Zhengzhou’s location as 
the geographic centre of China’s population, where nearly 30 percent of China’s GDP is 
produced within a range of 500km of the city, providing airplanes, trains, and motor vehicles 
with the shortest average travel times to major domestic markets. Zhengzhou has become 
an advantageous location for logistics industries especially time-critical goods requiring 
express delivery.  
A range of government-led initiatives have accelerated the development. For example, the 
e-commerce and business platform being supported by an electronic customs clearance 
system with single-window declaration along with express inspection and export-import 
clearance allowing users easy to buy from and sell to internationally. Airport cargo volumes 
expanded from 85,000 metric tons in 2010 to 457,000 metric tonnes in 2016. Several of the 
world’s large logistics companies, such as UPS, DHL, AirBridgeCargo and Cargolux, 
established distribution centres there (Jiang, 2014). Many of these investments are linked to 
the presence of Foxconn, the Taiwanese sub-contractor to Apple, which moved its assembly 
plant from Shenzhen to ZAEZ in 2010. Several tech companies have since clustered in the 
ZAEZ. Employing 300,000 workers, the cluster produced over 250 million mobile phones 
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including more than 100 million iPhone in 2016, contributed 67 per cent of Henan’s exports 
(ZZMG, 2017). Again, the relocation of Foxconn was not because of solely market process, 
but rather a result of Henan provincial government led bargaining by offering free land-use 
rights and plant and dormitory buildings which were made ready for moving in within three 
months after signing the agreement (Xu, 2010). In addition, the recruitment of the 
workforce led by provincial officials and training provided by local governments in Henan 
province to meet the requirements also played a vital role (Barboza, 2018). Quantifying 
precisely the real value of the financial incentives provided to Foxconn is hampered by the 
lack of publicly available data. But, in 2016, the New York Times reported they included 
discounted energy and transportation costs, lower social insurance payments, grants worth 
more than US$1.5 billion for the construction of factories and workers’ accommodation and 
provided a US$250 million loan to Foxconn.  
Rapid urban expansion requires massive investment in infrastructure. However, after the 
fiscal reform in 1994, a series of new responsibilities have been placed on local 
governments, but without decentralisation of fiscal autonomy and financial resources. Local 
governments, therefore, have become heavily reliant on generating so-called “extra-
budget” revenues to fulfil the devolved responsibilities. Borrowing from the shadow banking 
system and selling land-use rights are the two largest sources of finance used by local 
governments (OECD, 2009; Wang, X., 2014; Zhang, 2014). During the period from 1999 to 
2016, while local governments debt accumulated, risking financial stability, annual extra-
budget revenue made from selling land-use rights increased from RMB 51.4 billion (US$ 6.21 
billion) in 1999 to 3.75 trillion (US$ 564.56 billion) in 2016, driving the ratio of local 
budgetary revenue from 9.19% to 42.96% (CMF, 2017; McKinsey Global Institute, 2015).  
In Zhengzhou, local government debt is mainly in the form of direct borrowing from locally 
controlled banks and loans against land from large commercial banks. Comprehensive 
longitudinal data are not available, but the local congress’ approval to convert unrepaid 
loans to local treasury bonds may tell the part of the story. In 2015 and 2016, Zhengzhou 
Municipal Government converted RMB39.48 billion (US$ 6.34 billion) and RMB45.4 billion 
(US$ 6.83 billion) bank loans to treasury bonds, accounting for 101% and 108% of its annual 
fiscal revenue respectively (ZZFB, 2016, 2017), although it is likely that the value of total 
debt is much higher. The annual land use review shows that loans made on land in 2015 
were recorded at RMB 57.87 billion (US$ 9.29 billion), 1.47 times of its fiscal revenue in that 
year (ZZLRB, 2016). Meanwhile, through public-private partnerships (PPP), a policy tool 
developed since 2015, Zhengzhou contracted RMB394.8 billion (US$ 63.39 billion) and 
RMB699.0 billion (US$ 105.23 billion) for infrastructure investments in 2015 and 2016 
respectively, both again have significantly exceeded its fiscal revenue (ZZFB, 2016, 2017). 
The pressure brought by fast growing debt had directed local government to rely 
increasingly on land financialisation. Partially released documents show that within 10 
years, the net income made from selling land-use rights increased from RMB1.74 billion 
(US$ 0.22 billion), 14.2% of fiscal revenue in 2007, to RMB49.62 billion (US$ 7.47 billion), 
more than 1.18 times of its fiscal revenue in 2016 (ZZFB, 2017). This has been achieved 
through selling more land and forcing up land prices. Both, however, have reached their 
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limit because the allowance of land conversion had been exceeded year after year and 
house prices are already out of reach of many households (ZZLRB, 2016).      
   
Challenges ahead    
Zhengzhou’s recent rapid rise throws up some severe challenges. First, spatial enlargement 
of the urban area without a systematic and research-based long-term plan has led to 
disorderly urban sprawl (see details in Mu, et al., 2016). Planning, in the Chinese context, is 
both a political and technical exercise without a statutory basis. Political leaders use the FYP 
to promote their interests; urban plans serve as technical exercises to meet the output 
targets set in the FYP. Very often, this is translated into an approach where plans are subject 
to short-term political decision-making by local leaders under competitive pressure to meet 
their own targets. This is obvious in Zhengzhou. Establishing the HTDZ in 1988, the ETDZ in 
1993, the ZDND in 2001, the ZAEZ in 2007 and the subsequent developments, notably 
Zhengzhou-Kaifeng new district in 2009, and the western new district in 2015, represent 
different priorities of development emphasised by different leaders at the time. But their 
relationships with the existing areas and between them have rarely been properly 
considered when each decision was made to develop a new area, which is arguably the 
main cause behind the problems facing today, such as traffic congestion.        
Second, the success of urban development in the long-run rests ultimately on its quality, not 
just its quantity. Whereas economic development refers to the increase of productivity, 
skills, incomes, and embedded innovation and creativity, growth may be simply a result of 
increase output. Zhengzhou’s rapid economic growth in recent years relies heavily on 
investment in infrastructure and manufacturing. However, both have now become 
problematic. Investment in infrastructure is funded mainly by the revenues from sales of 
land-use rights. This has been the driving force for spiralling housing prices in Zhengzhou’s 
newly developed areas, making housing unfordable for most working families but a subject 
for speculative investment for a rich few (Scott, 2016). At the same time, mobile investment 
attracted from elsewhere to the newly established industrial zones in Zhengzhou, is far from 
embedded in the region. Even those labelled as “high-end manufacturing” add little to the 
innovative capacity of the economy. Much development is best described as a “branch plant 
economy” taking the advantages of lower labour costs, but such advantages have been 
increasingly eroded because of the rapid increase of wages. Moreover, despite the massive 
property development and low occupancy rates, migration workers attracted by 
opportunities in the mobile factories and the labour-intensive sector find it difficult to live in 
the city either because they cannot afford to own home or because they lack Hukou rights. 
This population group was estimated to be around 1.5 million in 2015 (ZZSB, 2016).      
Third, Zhengzhou’s fast growth is best explained by the co-effect of state-directed capitalism 
and state-sponsored neoliberalism (Chu & So, 2010; The Economist, 2012). While the 
former, using the state power, placed the city in a privileged position, benefiting from the 
special support both from the provincial and central governments, the latter allows the city 
more autonomy in making decisions about urban development. In the context of Chinese 
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governance, state-sponsored neoliberalism is challenging the authoritarian state capitalism, 
particularly, in circumstances where local officials see progress as linked to economic 
performance and favourable growth rankings, creating the conditions for fierce inter-
jurisdictional competition (Pike, et al., 2017). Zhengzhou’s competitive advantages drawing 
on the designation of conducting various national experiments are challenged by competing 
initiatives  elsewhere, such as Changsha, even within the province. Meanwhile, its “low 
road” approach to economic development based on attracting mobile investment places it 
in the vulnerable position when labour costs rise.   
Fourth, rapid urban sprawl has generated severe environmental pressures. Although 
sustainable urbanisation has been widely deployed since the State Council’s New-Approach 
to Urbanization Plan (2014-2020), it is trumped by a much stronger and deeper 
commitment to a narrower focus upon economic output targets. Zhengzhou suffers from 
severe problems of urban pollution and is regularly ranked among the 10 worst places in 
China for particulate matter and growing rates of respiratory disease (OECD, 2015). The 
worsening air pollution has emerged as a pressing political problem hence prompted the 
national Ministry of Environmental Protection to introduce a rule allowing it to summon 
local leaders for warning discussions about the situation. The mayor of Zhengzhou was 
called to a meeting in 2015 (Li, J., 2015). In 2015, to suppress dust, Zhengzhou city 
authorities had to use 3.5 million tonnes of imported water every day to deal with haze 
(People's Daily Online, 2015). Although the Ministry of Housing and Rural-Urban 
Development required Zhengzhou (along with 13 other cities) to designate an urban growth 
boundary (China Daily, 2015), but there are both political and governance obstacles to 
making these measures effective (OECD, 2015).    
Finally, despite the State Council’s call for “people centred” urbanisation, the governance 
system and the systematically developed and deeply rooted assessment criteria of local 
performance continue to prompt local decision makers to focus on narrowly defined 
economic growth targets, fuelling unchecked territorial competition. This has been 
translated into a state entrepreneurial approach to urban development. The pressing 
problems facing most Chinese cities today are the shortage of social infrastructure and the 
sky-high housing prices. Both are arguably a result of state entrepreneurialism. City 
governments expect to attract industrial investment through prioritising investment in 
economic infrastructure, but land financialisation drives up the land prices and the costs of 
providing social infrastructure. Many planned social infrastructure and facilities have never 
been built because of lack of funds. In Zhengzhou, investment in fixed assets3 has increased 
ninefold from RMB 50.04 billion (US$ 6.05 billion) in 2003 to RMB 450.93 billion (US$ 71.69 
billion) in 2013 and built-up urban area expanded almost doubled from 212.4km2 to 
382.7km2. But the numbers of primary and secondary schools have dropped from 1489 to 
355 and 980 to 268 respectively, although the number of pupils are fluctuated increasing 
(ZZSB, 2016). House prices, on the other hand, have grown three times faster than average 
income growth.  
                                                     
3 Data on investment in social and economic infrastructure are not available, but investment in fixed assets 
provide a proximation.  
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Conclusion  
The rapid recent growth of Zhengzhou, which leaves it on the cusp of megacity status, has 
been both impressive and distinctive. Agglomeration economies arising from market 
process used to explain urban growth elsewhere, provide, at best, a partial account of 
Zhengzhou’s growth. Globalisation and innovation increasingly provide the context for 
urban development, but geography, natural endowments, politics, institutions, history, and 
economic structure, continue play a key role. This is particularly the case in the context of an 
authoritarian economy. The rise of Zhengzhou from a small town to megacity in less than 
seven decades has reflected its geographical location and its status as the provincial capital 
of Henan in China’s multi-level governance system. Support from the provincial and central 
government has been critical to speed and nature of Zhengzhou’s development. The 
ambitious plan to create a EuroAsian transportation and logistics hub and an international 
capital of commerce underpinned by the fast-growing e-commerce cross-border trade and 
related logistics industries offers development potential. But with the weak embeddedness 
of leading enterprises and limited endogenous innovation, raise questions about the 
resilience of this mode of development. The recent shift to a kind local state-sponsored neo-
liberalism, with its tendency to wasteful forms of territorial competition raises additional 
concerns. Rising environmental costs and growing social exclusion and intra-urban 
inequalities are clear threats. In the face of these, innovation and reform in governance, is 
necessary if Zhengzhou is to develop towards a well-functioning megacity.   
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